At another time the differences between two brothers named Chaerephon
and Chaerecrates, both well known to him, had drawn his attention; and
on seeing the younger of the two he thus addresed him.
Socrates. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are not, I take it, one of those
strange people who believe that goods are better and more precious
than a brother;[1] and that too although the former are but senseless
chattels which need protection, the latter a sensitive and sensible
being who can afford it; and what is more, he is himself alone, whilst
as for them their name is legion. And here again is a marvellous
thing: that a man should count his brother a loss, because the goods
of his brother are not his; but he does not count his fellow-citizens
loss, and yet their possessions are not his; only it seems in their
case he has wits to see that to dwell securely with many and have
enough is better than to own the whole wealth of a community and to
live in dangerous isolation; but this same doctrine as applied to
brothers they ignore. Again, if a man have the means, he will purchase
domestic slaves, because he wants assistants in his work; he will
acquire friends, because he needs their support; but this brother of
his--who cares about brothers? It seems a friend may be discovered in
an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood relation who is also a
brother. And yet it is a great vantage-ground towards friendship to
have sprung from the same loins and to have been suckled at the same
breasts, since even among beasts a certain natural craving, and
sympathy springs up between creatures reared together.[2] Added to
which, a man who has brothers commands more respect from the rest of
the world than the man who has none, and who must fight his own
battles.[3]
Chaerephon. I daresay, Socrates, where the differences are not profound,
reason would a man should bear with his brother, and not avoid him for
some mere trifle's sake, for a brother of the right sort is, as you
say, a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis of that, why should
a man lay his hand to achieve the impossible?
Socrates. Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any
more than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable
enough?
Chaerephon. Nay, there you hit it. That is just why I have a right to
detest him. He can be pleasing enough to others, but to me, whenever
he appears on the scene, he is not a blessing--no! but by every manner
of means the reverse.
Socrates. May it not happen that just as a horse is no gain to the inexpert
rider who essays to handle him, so in like manner, if a man tries to
deal with his brother after an ignorant fashion, this same brother
will kick?
Chaerephon. But is it likely now? How should I be ignorant of the art of
dealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and
good deeds in kind? But a man who tries all he can to annoy me by word
and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit, and, what is more, I will
not try.
Socrates. Well now, that is a marvellous statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog,
the serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the
hand of your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show
his teeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's ill-temper, you try
to propitiate him by kindness; but your brother? If your brother were
what he ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you--that you
admit; and, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts
and words, yet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him
your best of friends.
Chaerephon. I am afraid, Socrates, that I have no wisdom or cunning to make
Chaerephon bear himself towards me as he should.
Socrates. Yet there is no need to apply any recondite or novel machinery.
Only bait your hook in the way best known to yourself, and you will
capture him; whereupon he will become your devoted friend.
Chaerephon. If you are aware that I know some love-charm, Socrates, of
which I am the happy but unconscious possessor, pray make haste and
enlighten me.
Socrates. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to
invite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day,[4] what steps would
you take?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should set him a good example by inviting him myself
on a like occasion.
Socrates. And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your
affairs during your absence abroad, how would you achieve your
purpose?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should present a precedent in undertaking to look
after his in like circumstances.
Socrates. And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under
his roof while visiting his country, what would you do?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should begin by offering him the shelter of my own
roof when he came to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in furthering
the objects of my visit; it is plain I should first show my readiness
to do as much for him in a like case.
Socrates. Why, it seems you are an adept after all in all the philtres
known to man, only you chose to conceal your knowledge all the while;
or is it that you shrink from taking the first step because of the
scandal you will cause by kindly advances to your brother? And yet it
is commonly held to redound to a man's praise to have outstripped an
enemy in mischief or a friend in kindness. Now if it seemed to me that
Chaerephon were better fitted to lead the way towards this
friendship,[5] I should have tried to persuade him to take the first
step in winning your affection, but now I am persuaded the first move
belongs to you, and to you the final victory.
Chaerephon. A startling announcement, Socrates, from your lips, and most
unlike you, to bid me the younger take precedence of my elder brother.
Why, it is contrary to the universal custom of mankind, who look to
the elder to take the lead in everything, whether as a speaker or an
actor.
Socrates. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step
aside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place? Is
he not expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the
honour of a soft couch,[6] to yield him precedence in argument?
My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying,[7] but put out your
hand caressingly, and you will see the worthy soul will respond at
once with alacrity. Do you not note your brother's character, proud
and frank and sensitive to honour? He is not a mean and sorry rascal
to be caught by a bribe--no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No!
gentle natures need a finer treatment. You can best hope to work on
them by affection.
Chaerephon. But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he
shows no change for the better?
Socrates. At the worst you will have shown yourself to be a good, honest,
brotherly man, and he will appear as a sorry creature on whom kindness
is wasted. But nothing of the sort is going to happen, as I
conjecture. My belief is that as soon as he hears your challenge, he
will embrace the contest; pricked on by emulous pride, he will insist
upon getting the better of you in kindness of word and deed.
At present you two are in the condition of two hands formed by God to
help each other, but which have let go their business and have turned
to hindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet
fashioned on the Divine plan to work together, but which have
neglected this in order to trammel each other's gait. Now is it not
insensate stupidity[8] to use for injury what was meant for advantage?
And yet in fashioning two brothers God intends them, methinks, to be
of more benefit to one another than either two hands, or two feet, or
two eyes, or any other of those pairs which belong to man from his
birth.[9] Consider how powerless these hands of ours if called upon to
combine their action at two points more than a single fathom's length
apart;[10] and these feet could not stretch asunder[11] even a bare
fathom; and these eyes, for all the wide-reaching range we claim for
them, are incapable of seeing simultaneously the back and front of an
object at even closer quarters. But a pair of brothers, linked in
bonds of amity, can work each for the other's good, though seas divide
them.[12]
[1] Cf. "Merchant of Venice," II. viii. 17: "Justice! the law! my
ducats, and my daughter!"
[2] Or, "a yearning after their foster-brothers manifests itself in
animals." See "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel to this
discussion.