Book III
16. That the Institution of Government is not a Contract
THE legislative power once well established, the next thing is to
establish similarly the executive power; for this latter, which operates
only by particular acts, not being of the essence of the former, is
naturally separate from it. Were it possible for the Sovereign, as such,
to possess the executive power, right and fact would be so confounded
that no one could tell what was law and what was not; and the body
politic, thus disfigured, would soon fall a prey to the violence it was
instituted to prevent.
As the citizens, by the social contract, are all equal, all can
prescribe what all should do, but no one has a right to demand that
another shall do what he does not do himself. It is strictly this right,
which is indispensable for giving the body politic life and movement,
that the Sovereign, in instituting the government, confers upon the
prince.
It has been held that this act of establishment was a contract between
the people and the rulers it sets over itself, -- a contract in which
conditions were laid down between the two parties binding the one to
command and the other to obey. It will be admitted, I am sure, that this
is an odd kind of contract to enter into. But let us see if this view
can be upheld.
First, the supreme authority can no more be modified than it can be
alienated; to limit it is to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory
for the Sovereign to set a superior over itself; to bind itself to obey
a master would be to return to absolute liberty.
Moreover, it is clear that this contract between the people and such and
such persons would be a particular act; and from this is follows that it
can be neither a law nor an act of Sovereignty, and that consequently it
would be illegitimate.
It is plain too that the contracting parties in relation to each other
would be under the law of nature alone and wholly without guarantees of
their mutual undertakings, a position wholly at variance with the civil
state. He who has force at his command being always in a position to
control execution, it would come to the same thing if the name
"contract" were given to the act of one man who said to another: "I give
you all my goods, on condition that you give me back as much of them as
you please."
There is only one contract in the State, and that is the act of
association, which in itself excludes the existence of a second. It is
impossible to conceive of any public contract that would not be a
violation of the first.