Book IV
II
 

Or to come to a third kind--the class of people who are persuaded that they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom: his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.

Euthydemus[1] "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand) collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and philosophers,[2] by help of which he already believed himself to be more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action.[3] At first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not as yet set foot in the agora,[4] but if he had anything to transact, his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: "Was it through consorting with the wise,[5] or by his own unaided talent, that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community instinctively turned to him?" Socrates, with a view to stirring[6] Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall.[7]

On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse,[8] as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.

Socrates. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything from anybody, he has ready for the occasion.[9] Clearly at the outset he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action, have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as been at pains to provide muself with a teacher from amongst those who have knowledge;[10] on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I shall be glad to place at your disposal." . . . How appropriate[11] would such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of state physician,[12] would it not? How advantageously he might begin an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however, you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).

Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that defect, proceeded.

Socrates. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent politically as orators and statesmen,[13] there are some who cannot see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.

Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone,[14] and when Euthydemus was seated by his side the following conversation took place.

Socrates. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me, that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise," as they are called?[15]

Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.

Socrates. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts[16] of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.

And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he to himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased with the praise, continued.

Socrates. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you collect books?

And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why, the prescriptions[17] of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large library by themselves.

No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).

Socrates. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of well-stored wit and judgment.[18]

I have no such ambition (he replied).

Socrates. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus?[19]

Euthydemus. No, nor yet a mathematician.

Socrates. Then do you wish to be an astronomer?[20] or (as the youth signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist?[21] (he asked), for I am told you have the entire works of Homer in your possession.[22]

Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are empty-pated creatures enough themselves.[23]

At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators fit to rule and apt to benefit[24] the rest of the world and themselves?

Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire--beyond measure.

Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but (he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in these matters without being just and upright?[25]

Euthydemus. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness it is impossible to be a good citizen.

No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?

Euthydemus. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as an upright man.

And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?

Euthydemus. To be sure they have.

Socrates. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his, should he not?

I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort within reach of eye and ear every day.

Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side,[26] and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to the account of W?

By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.

Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and continued.

Socrates. Lying exists among men, does it not?

Euthydemus. Certainly.

To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).

Euthydemus. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.

Socrates. Deceit too is not uncommon?

Euthydemus. By no means.

Socrates. To which side shall we place deceit?

Euthydemus. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.

Socrates. Well, and chicanery[27] or mischief of any sort?

Euthydemus. That too.

Socrates. And the enslavement of free-born men?[28]

Euthydemus. That too.

Socrates. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

It would be monstrous (he replied).

Socrates. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to say that he is doing wrong?

Euthydemus. By no means.

Socrates. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?

Euthydemus. Certainly.

Socrates. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?

Euthydemus. That would be all fair and right also.

Socrates. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right?

Euthydemus. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.

Socrates. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?

Euthydemus. Apparently.

Socrates. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible.[29]

I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).

So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud?[30]

On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).

Socrates. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?

Euthydemus. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.

Socrates. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?

Euthydemus. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.

Socrates. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?

Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement.[31]

Socrates. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false entry on our lists. . . . But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?

Euthydemus. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them.[32] Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.

Socrates. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar?[33]

Euthydemus. That is my opinion.

Socrates. And which should you say was more a man of letters[34]--he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?

Euthydemus. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Socrates. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate?[35]

Euthydemus. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.

Socrates. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?[36]

Euthydemus. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.

Socrates. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge?[37]

Euthydemus. Yes.

Socrates. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?

Euthydemus. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail of my own admission.[38]

Socrates. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east," and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that, now more, now less--what do you think of such a man?

Euthydemus. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.

Socrates. And you know the appellation given to certain people-- "slavish,"[39] or, "little better than a slave?"

Euthydemus. I do.

Socrates. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to whom it is applied?

Euthydemus. Clearly of their ignorance.

Socrates. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?

Euthydemus. No, certainly not.

Socrates. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?

Euthydemus. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.

Socrates. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?

Euthydemus. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than slaves."

Socrates. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of the beautiful, the good, the just?[40]

It is, in my opinion (he replied).

Socrates. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the imputation of being slaves?

Euthydemus. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and goodness his pursuit.[41] So that now you may well imagine my despair when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.

Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?

Yes, certainly; twice (said he).

Socrates. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?

Euthydemus. I did.

Socrates. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?

I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the world did I know?

Socrates. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?

Euthydemus. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not himself.

Socrates. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants, nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in what is ill.

Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his performance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad to make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his protection;[42] they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all these causes[43] single him out as the chief object of their affection. He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of dishonour and contempt.

What is true of individuals is true also of communities.[44] That state which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.

Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you for an explanation, if you would kindly give one.[45]

Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?

Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave.[46]

Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so termed.

That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the next place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks, and habits of life,[47] I regard as good or evil according as they contribute either to health or to disease.

Socrates. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be soruces of any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?

And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?

Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to spare--when those who owing to their health and strength take a part in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind--as hors de combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are saved.

Euthydemus. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages to be got from strength and lost through weakness.

Socrates. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?

Euthydemus. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom,[48] Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good; since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better than a fool.

Socrates. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus,[49] how he was seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave, and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among barbarians and again enslaved?

Yes, I know the old story (he answered).[50]

Socrates. Or have you not heard of the "woes of Palamedes,"[51] that commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him and slew him?

Euthydemus. That tale also is current.

Socrates. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his court enslaved?[52]

Well, prosperity, well-being[53] (he exclaimed), must surely be a blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?

It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in itself a compound of other questionable blessings.

Euthydemus. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can possibly be questionable?

None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that kind?

Euthydemus. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would happiness be without these?

Socrates. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their fair faces at the hand of admireres driven to distraction[54] by the sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted against and destroyed![55] how many through fame and political power have suffered a world of woe!

Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness, I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in prayer.[56]

Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to direct, is democratically constituted,[57] of course you know what a democracy is.

Euthydemus. I presume I do, decidedly.

Socrates. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without knowing who the people are?

Euthydemus. Certainly not.

Socrates. And whom do you consider to be the people?

Euthydemus. The poor citizens, I should say.

Socrates. Then you know who the poor are, of course?

Euthydemus. Of course I do.

Socrates. I presume you also know who the rich are?

Euthydemus. As certainly as I know who are the poor.

Socrates. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?

Euthydemus. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their necessaries,[58] and by rich those who have more means than sufficient for all their needs.

Socrates. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?

I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.

Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?

Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he went away crestfallen, in an agony of self- contempt, persuaded that he was verily and indeed no better than a slave.

Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as dolts and dullards.[59] But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that, in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some necessity, he never left him--in some points even imitating him in his habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held to be needful to know or important to practise.

[1] Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps. See Plat. "Symp." 222 B, and Jowet ad loc.; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 372 foll. For {ton kalon} cf. "Phaedr." 278 E, "Isocrates the fair." For the whole chapter cf. Plat. "Alc." i.; "Lys." 210 E. See above, "Mem." I. ii. 29; Grote, "Plato," i. ch. x. passim.

[2] Lit. "sophists." See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 480, note. For private libraries see Becker, "Char." p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)

[3] See "Hipparch," i. 24; "Cyrop." V. v. 46.

[4] See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid. cf. Isocr. "Areop." 149 C.

[5] Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.

[6] L. and S. cf. Plat. "Lys." 223 A; "Rep." 329 B: "Wishing to draw him out."

[7] Cf. Plat. "Alc." i. 118 C: "And Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers" (Jowett).

[8] {sunedrias}, "the council."

[9] Or, "the pretty exordium . . . now in course of conposition. He must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore beginning his speech thus?"

[10] Or, "scientific experts."

[11] Al. "Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to begin with a like exordium." {armoseie} = "it would be consistent (with what has gone before)."

[12] Schneider cf. Plat. "Laws," iv. 720 A; "Gorg." 456 A; and for "the parish doctor," "Polit." 259 A; Arist. "Acharn." 1030.

[13] Or, more lit. "powerful in speech and action within the sphere of politics."

[14] The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or imaginary?

[15] Or, "have collected several works of our classical authors and philosophers."

[16] Lit. "gnomes," maxims, sententiae. Cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 21.

[17] {suggrammata}, "medical treatises." See Aristot. "Eth." x. 9, 21.

[18] Or, "To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed wisdom."

[19] Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. "Theaet.") taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8, 19.

[20] Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.

[21] See "Symp." iii. 6; Plat. "Ion."

[22] See Jowett, "Plato," i. 229; Grote, "Plato," i. 455.

[23] Or, "are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves."

[24] Or, "statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of the rest of the world and themselves."

[25] Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous. Justice, {dikaiosune} = social uprightness = righteousness, N.T. To quote a friend: "The Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct, which is what we mean by 'upright.'"

[26] The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).

[27] Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob.

[28] Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery." {to andrapodizesthai} = the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.

[29] Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."

[30] Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.

[31] See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).

[32] Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be twisted topsy-turvy."

[33] {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge of the Just.

[34] Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."

[35] Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"

[36] Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?

Euth. Clearly he does.

[37] Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the {episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such {episteme}?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp. min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.

[38] Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also, heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).

[39] {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and a low order of intellect, cf. "boorish,' "rustic," "loutish," ("pariah," conceivably). "Slavish," "servile," with us connote moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See Newman, op. cit. i. 107.

[40] Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."

[41] {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}-- nobility of soul. Cf. above, I. vi. 14.

[42] Cf. Dante, "Tu duca, tu maestro, tu signore."

[43] Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or if {dia tauta}, translate "and therefore."

[44] Or, more lit. "A law which applies, you will observe, to bodies politic."

[45] Or, "at what point to commence the process of self-inspection?-- there is the mystery. I look to you, if you are willing, to interpret it."

[46] Lit. "if I did not know even that."

[47] Or, "pursuits and occupations"; "manners and customs."

[48] See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.

[49] See Ovid. "Met." viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. "Fab." 39, 40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.

[50] Or, "Ah yes, of course; the tale is current."

[51] See Virg. "Aen." ii. 90; Hygin. 105; Philostr. "Her." x.

[52] Cf. Herod. iii. 129.

[53] {to eudaimonein}, "happiness." Cf. Herod. i. 86.

[54] Cf. Plat. "Rep." vii. 517 D; "Phaedr." 249 D.

[55] e.g. Alcibiades.

[56] See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.

[57] Or, "popularly governed."

[58] Al. "who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes (according to the census)."

[59] Or, "as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament." Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 488 A.